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Collingwood 1 s Idea of History: 
The Development and Form of Historical Inquiry 
Introduction 
History was long considered a somehow second-rate discipline, incapable of 
producing true knowledge like math or the hard sciences. Whether viewed as 
~he handmaiden of theology in the Middle Ages or simply denied a place among the 
sciences by the latter-day positivists, history 1 s independence and value as a 
study in its own right have been denied from many points of view at different 
~imes. R. G. Collingwood takes issue with this attitude towards history by 
l'~s~tonomy both in subject and method in his ihe Idea of History. His 
!inquiry into the nature of history is divided into two parts. The first is 
essentially historical, reviewing how historical studies, or the discipline 
of history, fared in Western thought from Herodotus to the 1930's. This first 
section aims at tracing the gradual emergence of a full-fledged, independent 
idea of history. The other part is more philosphical, taking up such questions 
'as the value of history, what a uniquely historical study must consist of, and 
how to undertake such a study. Following Collingwood's organization, I will 
'evaluate first the historical, then the philosophical questions. 
Before beginning this analysis of his work, it might be useful to sketch 
' 
Collingwood's positions and objectives, and give a an indication of my aims. 
Coll1ngwood divides the history of thought into three stage~Grecian begin-
nings, the Middle Ages, and the sixteenth to the ninteenth centuries-- each 
characterized by its preoccupation with a particular intellectual problem. 
The idea and practice of history was molded by the temper of each of these 
1 
eras, until the emergence of autonomous history in the nineteenth century 
1 
based one of the central epistemological problems of the age. 
2 
MY evaluation of these historical roots will revolve around comparisons of 
Collingwood's notions about the\heory and practice of a particular time 
with a sample of the historical work of that time. 
It is difficult to trace the development of anything without an idea of 
what precisely this development is leading up to. For Collingwood, history 
is an autonomous science in the same sense as physics or mathematics, because 
it is capable of producing knowledge of the same caliber as these disciplines. 
lhe conditions that history must meet to achieve this ideal are rather ele-
gantly summarized in Collingwood's statement that 11 history should be (a) a 
science or an answering of questions; (b) concerned wi'th human actions in the 
~ast; (c) pursued by the interpretation of evidence; and (d) for the sake of 
2 
Human se 1 f- knowledge. 11 
The philosophical second half of Collingwood's book is largely a more 
detailed working out of these four conditions. He covers topics ranging from 
the proper form for study of the human mind to the precise nature of histori-
dal evidence, with varying success. Some of his concerns are broadly theoreti-
c'al, as he inquires into the nature of thought and knowledge, while others 
ah:. of more immediate interest to historians, such as how to reason from his-
t'orical evidence, or the role of imaqination in historical narrative. The 
driving question throughout the Epilegomena, though, is how to achieve auto-
nomy. Collingwood is concerned with establishing autonomy on two levels; for 
the discipline of history, and for its individual practitioners. 
Rather than attempt to follow Collingwood's organization closely, a 
rather difficult task in this somewhat patched-together section, I will take up 
3 
the basic question of historical autonomy. The more abstract issues of mind 
ind knowledge will be slighted to provide a sharper focus en the practical 
implications of his theoretical search for autonomy. Specifically, his at-
tempt to distinguish history from the natural sciences will be examined to see 
~ow he highlights, and distorts, fundamental features of history. Colling-
wood's attempt to devise a theoretically pure method for doing history will be 
~crutinized with an eye to how he runs afoul of practical realities. 
Historical Inquiry 
The first truly historical work was done in fifth century Greece by 
Hbrodotus. Prior to his work, writing about the past.is best characterized 
a:S myth or legend, and exemplified by Homer or the anonymous Sumerians who 
carved the deeds of the gods in stone. This creation of true history by a 
f)fth-century Greek is made all the more remarkable by the strongly anti-
historical tendencies of Greek thought. The Greek conception of knowledge 
was based on the idea of the eternal, for only that which is unchanging can 
be truly known. All else is mere changable illusion and is thus too inde-
t$rminate to merit the label of knowledge. The Greek preoccupation with math~ 
matics is symptomatic of this view of knowledge, for mathematical truths are 
a6stract and timeless, true everywhere and always. More mundane matters of 
e~pirical fact, which are always changing, count only as opinion. On this 
view, history is clearly excluded from the realm of knowledge, for it is an 
account of what has passed and is no more. Its subject-matter is by defini-
tion transitory, and so can produce only opinion, not knowledge. 
Nonetheless, the Greeks did place some value on history. They saw his-
tory as useful for the very practical reason that the lessons of the past 
4 
can be put to good use in today's affairs. It is useful only as opinion, 
though, for history produces accounts of unique and transitory events, not 
tne eternal truths that are the stuff of knowledge. 
Herodotus produced his Histories within this hostile environment. 
Collingwood claims that his work is a true scientific history, for reasons 
that shall be examined shortly. He does not make c'lear how Herodotus's 
contemporaries viewed his work. Did they, like Collingwood, consider his 
method sufficiently rigorous to extract knowledge from illusion? Apparent-
lj not, since his ideas withered away soon after his death, and he did not 
ct.eate an ongoing tradition or school of historians. From the classical 
Gr.eek's point of view, then, not even Herodotus's History was scientific, 
sfoce its very subject matter was in principle incapable of producing the 
l 
eternal truths that are the hallmark of knowledge. 
From Collingwood's vantage in the early twentieth century, though, 
H~rodotus was a truly scientific historian because he met each of the four 
conditions for scientific history in Collingwood's definition. The first 
two conditions, that history be a science concerned with human actions in 
t~e past, were met by Herodotus as he made the transition from legend-
wtiting to history. His work is a primarily humanistic inquiry into the 
c~uses and course of the Persian wars. He meets the fourth condition, that 
history be done for the sake of human self-knowledge, by stating in his 
introductory sentence that his purpose is to "preserve from decay the re-
3 
membrance of what men have done" • 
His real accomplishment, though, is his application of a critical method 
tb his ~~urces, for this is what truly elevates his work to the level of 
stientific history by meeting Collingwood's third condition that evidence be 
5 
interpreted. Herodotus did not blindly copy the eyewitness narratives that 
were his raw material. Instead, he cross-examined his witnesses, thus expand-
ing and interpreting their testimonial evidence to create a fuller, less dis-
4 
tarted picture of past events than unaided memory could produce. Even 
tnough this method is quite successful in Herodotus's hands, it is limi-
ted because the only material available to it must·be in living memory. As 
a result, it limits the Greek historical perspective to relatively recent 
eVents. Within these limits, though, Collingwood is satisfied to call Hero-
5 
dotus a scientific historian because of his critical approach to his sources 
Herodotus did not simply repeat what his sources told him, as a cred-
ulous chronicler. He was aware, for instance, of the different sides to 
the story of how the Persian Hai:s began, and contrasts the Persian and 
6 
Phoenecian versions almost immediately He is compelled by his critical 
attitude to acknowledge when the facts do not settle these conflicting ac-
7 
counts . If one source seems more reliable, Herodotus alerts the reader 
8 i • 
to this fact and to his reasons for believing so . Where an account does 
seem implausib1e, as when Croesus is a11eged to have drained the river Halys 
9 
' to gain passage for his armies, he expresses the reasons for his skepticism 
HJ is careful to disassociate himself somewhat from the more fantastic 
stories that he tells, as with "in his time a wonderful thing is said to have 
10 
h~ppened 11 This is not to say that Herodotus is completely objective, for 
he is still an ancient Greek, and so speaks matter-of-factly about such things 
11 
as prophets being moved by divine impulse 
Undoubtedly, Herodotus was a careful thinker, aware of the limitations 
of his sources and methods and not afraid to alert the reader to them. It 
6 
i~ remarkable that he could do as much as he did in the adverse intellectual 
climate of ancient Greece. Collingwood's treatment of him is therefore under-
s~andably sympathetic, but should be taken with a grain of salt. His account 
ofi the historical method used by He~~dotus sounds quite factual, fu;Jl of \\~ / 
11 q'uite clearly 1 s 11 and "must haves" In fact, though, it is specu-7~ '[/ 
lation, if rather solidly grounded speculation. This is unfortunate, because 
Collingwood attaches a great deal of importance to this method, claiming that 
13 
it enabled Herodotus to create knowledge where there was none before 
For Collingwood, such knowledge ;·s achieved by interpreting evidence, and it is 
not clear that his speculative account of Herodotus's techniques is adequate 
to justify calling what Herodotus produced knowledge. 
A long decline set in after the deaths of Herodotus and his follower Thuc-
ydides. Writing about the past descended into legend-writing and chronicles 
of what various authorities had to say about history. It was not until the 
id'eas of Christianity began to take hold and Christian scholarship developed 
in the early Middle Ages that the idea of history began to develop again. 
Th~s Christian influence is the distinguishing feature of the second of 
I 
Collingwood's three eras in the history of thought. Unfortunately his treat-
ment of medieval and Renaissance history is extremely sketchy and general, 
miking this section the weakest in the book. I will examine the works of Bede 
an'd Machiavelli to fill in this gap in his historical inquiry, and use their 
h~stories as a standard against which to measure Collingwood's generalities. 
According to Collingwood, the Christian worldview fundamentally altered 
' 
Gr,eek notions about the theory of history, even though there was no real ad-
v~nce in method until after the Middle Ages. He sees this ''leaven of Chris-
dan ideas" contributing much that is essential to modern history. He pin-
\i' 1 
7 
pdints two basic Classical assumptions about man and the world that Chris-
ti~nity replaced. 
The first of these assumptions has to do with human nature and the 
n~ture of human action and achievement. For the Greeks, man was a rational 
ag~nt who perceived what ends were desirable and exerted his will to attain 
them. If he failed, he had 11 mi ssed his mark", either through such inci denta 1 
agencies as the intervention of an outside force or because of some charac-
ter flaw of his own. Christianity took this inability to achieve chosen ends 
a~ a natural, permanent part of the human condition and explained it with 
the concepts of sin and grace. Human actions are not driven by intellectually 
conceived and rationally chosen ends, but by blind desire. This desire not 
only leads us into sin, but is the "inherent and original sin proper to our 
nature''. That which man does achieve is done because it is part of God's 
plan. It is through His grace that our desires and efforts are channelled 
14 
"''r; 
doctrine produced tremendous gains for ~·~ towards His constructive ends According to Collingwood, this 
history, as it allows the historian 
I 
to see that what happens is not necessarily 
15 
a direct product of anyone's will or "deliberately wishing it to happen" 
At .best, though, the Christian analysis cleared the ground for a 
b~tter realization of the role of circumstance and accident in history, since it 
i~ apparent that Herodotus was aware of these forces in his History. Certainly 
t~e medieval historians interpretation of this doctrine made history a 
p~ay written by God, with events thus being ascribed to Providence. As Col-
16 
11ngwood later recognizes , this is something of a backward step, 
el:iminating as it does the humanist nature of Greek hi story. \~hil e it may 
have served to allow later historians to see an internal logic of events, this 
8 
, 
first Christian idea seems initially to have been something of a mixed 
b1essing. 
The Greek substantialist notions about eternal entities that underly 
hi'.story but are untouched by historical change were also undermined by 
Christianity. Herodotus is not particularly guilty of substantialism, 
since he was interested in events as important in themselves. Later Greco-
Roman though, however, was increasingly interested in events only to the 
extent that they illuminated these eternal substances. Livy, for instance, 
wrote a history of Rome that was not an account of how Rome developed and came to 
be, but rather viewed Rome as a changeless entity that was complete at the be-
17 
ginning of his history Christianity rejected this view, 
holding that only God was eternal and all else was His creation, subject to 
fundamental changes through His Grace. The will of God may be manifested 
through what the Greeks would term the accidents alter and form the substance. 
This allows historical processes to create and destroy things, so that Greece 
and Rome are quite properly seen as the products of history, not its pre-
18 
·suppositions 
In addition to these two main points, Collingwood notes other charac-
teristics of modern history, including its apocalyptic bent and tendency to 
periodize, that can be traced to Christian influences. Like the second fund-
amental theoretical shift, these are relatively unproblematic, but he seems to 
run into trouble when he talks about universalism as a product and character-
19 
istic of Christian historiography As with Providential history, 
Collingwood seems ov~timistic, as the best that can be said is that Chris-
tianity left room for such cosmopolitan histories, but by no means compelled 
t~em. In practice, medieval historians seem, at the very least, no less sub-
j~ct to provincialism than classical historians. 
9 
Bede wrote his History of The English Church ~ People in the eighth 
:entury, and it has since become an oft-cited example of medieval historical 
~
r1ork. It is typical of such histories in many ways, wr-itten as it was by a 
~DI".,<, ~r1est in conformity with the accepted ideas of the day, but it is set apart from 
nany monastical histories by its clarity of writing ~nd quality of thought. 
Nonetheless, Bede 1 s history exhibits the greatest flaw of medieval 
thought, a credulity that is at least partially rooted in the lack of a criti-
cal method for gathering and interpreting evidence. As Bede describes his work, 
20 
it is a chronicle, or collation of relevant portions of other works His 
primary authority was an Abbot Albinus, who along with other churchmen passed 
information that they 11 considered worthy of mention 11 along to Bede. He gives 
no indication that he did anything but accept their information uncritically. 
As a result, the book contains a great number of fantastic stories. For 
instance, he tells us quite matter-of-factly that St. Albans stopped a river {llvk-~ ~\ 
by prayer, providing an interesting contrast to Herodotus• skeptical treatment vA ~ 
21 ,./ l-~IW { 5"' Multiplying examples would be tediouc·, ~Ck...-r"" 
,cf :;::;: 
of Croesus and the river Halys 
since as an ecclesiastical history it is full of saint 1 s lives and miracles \ ~q::_;;; 
'·o ,¥:./ ~v that seem incredible to modern ears, though they were unquestioned during 
Bede 1 s day. 
As Collingwood indicates, medieval histories tended to be Providential 
history. Bede 1 s work bears out this assertion by placing God firmly at the 
center of the historical drama. The depredations of the invading Angles in 
the fifth century are characteri~ed as God 1 s judg~ent on the sins of the 
nation. Vortigern 1 s decision to invite the Angles into Britain to settle is thus 
explained only as 11 ordained by God as a punishment 11 • t~hen they were finally 
defeated, it was not because of inferior leadership, or overextended supply 
10 
22 
lines, but because the Britons had regained God's help. This nar-
rative reveals the flaw of Providential history, for it becomes unnecessary to 
inquire very deeply into the human reasons that underlay the twist and turn of 
events when such a ready explanation is at hand. 
Collingwood's assertion that medieval historiography promotes universal-
ism, or the writing of histories without a center of gravity, is not supported 
by Bede's work. Its title alone indicates that it is not a universal history, 
but is centered on England. More importantly, it is an ecclesiastical history, 
revolving almost entirely around the doings and development of the Church, which 
provides, in Collingwood's terms, "a particularistic center of gravity", an 
idea supposedly supplanted by Christian ideas. This provincialism is parti-
ularly evident in the accounts of the establishment of the Church, where no de-
tails of pre-Christian beliefs are given, and if they are described at all, are 
labelled as devil worship, Quite simply, anyone not a Christian is a pagan, 
and no more need be said, from Bede's point of view. This is hardly a cosmo-
23 L. (>. r-t \~ v- \'"'~ Jt'!'6Al\r.,_....., 
politan Or Universalist attitude. x~· \)::.O"'-' () 
Collingwood rather offhandedly notes that the Renaissance historians 
overcame the central problems of medieval historiography by returning to 
24 
humanist values and by prizing scholarship and factual accuracy 
It is therefore remarkable that he devotes only a little over a page to this 
revolution in historical thought, and gives no examples to speak of. 
Machiavelli's Histor~ of Florence largely bears out Collingwood's 
generalizations about Renaissance contributions to the theory and practice 
of history. Machiavelli makes clear his humanist orientation in the opening 
section where he demonstrates a concern for natural events and human actions 
. 25 
as the explanation for historical happenings At the beginning of 
11 
Book V he seeks explanations in the internal logic of human affairs rather 
26 
+h~~ placing them out of reach in the Grace of God He reduces religion 
to the same plane as other human activities, tracing St. Benedict's success 
in preserving Rome from barbarian depredations to his earthly reputation for 
27 . 
sanctity, not to any action, direct or not, of God's As Collingwood 
predicts, he is concerned with scholarship and factual accuracy, giving 
elaborate lists of adherents to various factions in Florentine politics, 
and taking great care in attempting to discover the true origin of the name 
28 
Florentia Machiavelli was not a scrupulous scholar, though, as some of 
his facts do seem unexamined. He blithely quotes a figure of 200,000 killed 
29 
during a certain battle, for instance Again, this. is in line with Col-
lingwood1s remarks on the Renaissance historian's lack of any~for 
30 ~ 
doing research or reconstructing history Indeed, Machiavelli 1s other 
works demonstrate little real awareness of methodological problems. 
In Chapter 15 of The Prince, Machiavelli mentions that his method dif-
fers from that of others who have written on political history because he is 
31 
concerned with the truth, not with constructing ideal states While 
The Rrince is not a work of history per se, it does draw heavily on history 
to teach its lessons in statecraft. ·For Machiavelli as for Herodotus, then, 
history should be studied for its practical lessons, a view he states ex-
32 
l 
plicitly in the opening of his Discourses on Livy As Collingwood in-
dicates, though, these inklings of history's purpose and uniqueness do not 
result in methodological insights. In fact, Machiavelli repeatedly notes 
Livy's practice of putting speeches into the mouths of his subjects, but 
never criticizes it and in one place even speaks of this practice with appro-
L_ -
12 
34 
ra 1 In short, serious methodological inquiry and 
:riticism do not show themselves in Machiavelli. However, caution should be 
~xercised in generalizing to all of Renaissance Italy from this one writer. 
The seventeenth century opened the third of Collingwood's periods in 
the history of thought with Bacon's and Descartes' work on the epistemological 
Jroblems of the natural sciences. Descartes' work in particular was a set-
Jack for the idea of autonomous history, for like the Greeks he held that 
~istory cannot produce knowledge. His criterion for truth, the clear and 
jistinct idea, was admirably suited for confirming the worth of the exact 
sciences. Descartes charged that history is incapable of describing past 
events exactly as they happened, since it must always edit some things out in 
order to carry on its narrative. Its ideas are thus fodistinct, and incap-
able of meeting his criteria for knowledge. The net result is that history 
may be interesting and instructive, but it is not scientific. However, many 
historians took Descartes ideas as a challenge to improve their methods, in 
35 
order to be able to craft ideas that are more clear and distinct . 
Giambattista Vico 1 ~ The New Science was aimed at resurrecting history 
- -- -
and providing it with an articulate method. In reply to Descartes, Vico a-
dopted a new criterion for knowledge, called the verum-factum doctrine, 
~ 
which held that to truly know something, as opposed to merely perceiving it, 
36 37 
the knower must have made it himself • This doctrine 
preserves the paramount place of mathematics as a source of knowledge, which 
' was important to the rationalists, and simultaneously elevates history to 
the same level of certainty. The subject-matter of history, the actions 
of men, is eminently suited for scientific study under the verum-factum doc-
- -
trine. Vico showed that the distinction between ideas and facts that lay 
13 
at the root of Descartes• skepticism simply could not apply in history, 
because there are no historical facts that do not exist in the minds of men 
38 
as ideas History as both phenomenon and discipline is made 
by men, so there is no appeal beyond this human point of view to the 11 facts 11 • 
Vico, having thus laid the general philosophical groundwork for history, was 
in a position to establish a method for acquiring historical knowledge. 
He enumerates three broad principles that underly history and allow the 
extension of historical knowledge by analogy from familiar periods to those 
that are more obscure. Certain periods of history, such as Homeric Greece 
and the Middle Ages, share a general character revealed in similar governments, 
economies, arts, and so on. Further, these periods fall into a cycle and 
recur in the same order. This cycle is not circular, 'though, but spiral, as 
39 
each period is a unique, particular phase of history that never repeats itself 
Vico also indicates several common sources of error in historical 
work, which include prejudices stemming from national pride or in favor of the 
40 
per.iod one studies, among others. > Finally, he enlarged the range 
. .:..__:____-
of sources on which an historian may draw, adding mythology, linguistics, and 
41 42 
custom to the arsenal of sources available to the historian. 
Collingwood, in his eagerness to set history back on its proper course, 
distilled all of these progressive elements from Vico. In so doing, however, 
he neglects Vico•s regressive tendency to resurrect the fallacies of medieval 
historiography that the Reaissance historians overcame. There can be no denying 
a humanist strain in Vico 1 s thought, but it coexists with a tendency to fall 
back on divine providence as the underlying scheme on which history is built. 
He states that history 11 must be a rational civil theology of divine provi-
43 
In so saying, he was not merely pointing out that much of dence 11 • 
history goes against the designs and intentions of men. Vico 1 s Providence 
44 
is composed of omnipotence, infinite wisdom and immeasurable goodness 
The ultimate responsibility for history lies with a divinity, not man. Si-
milarly, Vico lapses at time into a credulity that is quite reminiscent of 
14 
the Middle Ages. He proposes, for instance, "invincible proofs that the He-
brews were the first people in our world and that in the sacred history they 
have accurately preserved their memories from the very beginning of the world 11 
45 
or that, 11 giants ... existed in nature among all the first gentile nations 11 
One further point, recognized by Collingwood, denies any image of Vico 
as the modern father of scientific history. He, like Herodotus, founded no 
continuing tradition. His work was lost or ignored by his contemporaries 
as irrelevant, because the central concern of his era was with working out 
the bases and methods of the natural sciences. (l}shall pick up the thread of 
Collingwood 1 s narrative at the end of the ninteenth ce.ntury as we consider the 
final challenge that the natural sciences posed to autonomous history in the 
form of positivism. 
There was, of course, a great deal of work done during the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on the problems of history, an era that 
Collingwood terms th~hreshold of Scientific H~story. However destructive 
the arguments of this era may have been of~prior misconceptions about the 
nature of history, their constructive elements were either incomplete or 
-
misguided. The works of Hegel and Marx are particularly illustrative of this 
era because they synthesized and built on the advances of their predecessors 
while simultaneously making errors that are typical of the positivist position. 
Hegel 1 s Philosophy of History is valuable as a summation and synthe-
sis of the historical thought of prior historical thinkers ranging from 
15 
Kant to Herder. Collingwood isolates five ideas in Hegel that represent 
46 
the main advances in historical thinking of this 11 pre-scientific 11 era 
First, Hegel distinguishes nature and history on the .grounds 
that nature is strictly cyclical, each sunrise being identical to the last, 
while history travels in spirals, each recurrence made unique by the acqui-
sition of something new. In fact, evolution theory blurs this sharp line 
in some cases, but the distinction can be saved on methodological grounds once 
it is realized that only an historian reenacts in his mind the causes of the 
events that he is studying. Following this, and secondly, all history is 
the history of thought, for actions can be understood, as opposed to merely 
observed, only as the outward expression of thought. Thirdly, the driving 
force of history is a very peculiar kind of reason that is perhaps better 
characterized as mind because it iricorporates passionate and irrational ele-
ments. Fourthly, history is logical in that apparently disparate events 
are expressions of thought that form a logically connected chain behind the 
events. Finally, he maintained that history ends with the present for the 
simple reason that nothing else has yet happened, so that there is no evidence 
on future events for the historian to interpret. 
This much of Hegel's work is constructive. However, Hegel along with Marx 
made crucial errors that prevent their ideas of history from being fully 
' autonomous. Each wished to reduce the wide scope of history to one small 
segment, Hegel flinding explanations for everything in politics, Marx in econ-
omics. For them, history is not an autonomous fabric woven of independent 
threads of art, religion, politics and so on, but is dependent on politics or 
economics, all else being reflections of these. 
Hegel at least made history autonomous to the extent that it relied on 
16 
nothing beyond the logical necessity derived from the mind that drives it. 
Marx made an additional retrogressive move, though, by reasserting the prin-
ciple that historical events have natural causes. This is a positivistic 
move, where positivism 11 is defined as philosophy acting in the service of nat-
47 
ural science 11 Marx in effect asserts that, since historical 
causes are natural, they will submit .to examination by methods appropriate 
to the natural sciences. History is thus made subordinate to the natural 
sciences. It is assumed that only th•= natural science's claim to knowledge is 
legitimate, so if historians want to create knowledge, they must use natural 
48 
science methods. 
The last three authors to be considered can best be understood as operating 
in this positivistic environment. Two of them, Toynbee and Spengler, found it 
congenial, while Croce reacted against it. The positivist philosophers were 
concerned mainly with natural science, being convinced that only it could 
produce knowledge. When approaching history they tended to assimilate historical 
processes to the natural ones that hard science techniques were best suited to 
deal with. This assimilation both increased the reputability of history and 
destroyed its autonomy by making it seem that natural science methods were 
appropriate for historical studies. This method was simple; one ascertains 
the facts, then formulates general laws to account for them. Fortunately, 
historians had by this time developed a secure method of their own for finding 
facts, Philolosocal criticism, that can be traced to Vico through Hegel and 
Herder. Thus, they did not completely accept the natural science methodology 
pressed on them by the positivists, although they did concede some crucial points. 
Historians allowed their view of their subject-matter to be altered, Historical 
facts became separate or atomic entities, thus chopping up the field of history 
17 
into an infinity of independent facts. Like the scientific facts they were 
modeled on, these historical facts existed independently of the historian, 
who also acquired a scientific duty to eliminate all value judgements from 
his thinking. History was reduced to an account of external events and made inca~ 
49 
pable of looking at the thought out of which such events grow. 
With these general principles in mind, the influence of positivism on 
distinguished British scholar Arnold J. Toynbee 1 s work in the first volume of 
his Study of History can be seen. First, the advantageous effect of positivism 
must be noted. At the level of atomized, individual facts, Toynbee is im-
peccable and apparently displays a real mastery of a broad range of material. 
~
This follows very naturally from the positivist approach to history as a 
universe of discrete facts to be collected by historians. At the level of 
organization and general principles, though, the problems inherent in applying 
natural science thinking to historical questions becomes evident. 
Toynbee is very concerned with breaking the human experience down into 
comparable parts called societies and civilizations. He pursues a study 
of the external relations between one society and another, such as Western 
Christendom and the Classical Greeks. This too is in line with the natural 
science approach to questions, which demands the dispassionate comparison of 
commensurable phenomena so that an inductively valid pattern or general law may 
be derived. The unsuitability of this approach for history is indicated by the 
way that Toynbee must belabor his historical subjects to fit them into his cat-
egories. The most extreme example of the way his approach distorts history is 
his treatment of the Roman Empire. It was too closely related to Greece to be 
consdered a separate civilization in its own right, so he is forced by his 
model of history to consider it a phase in the decline of Hellenism. The sort 
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of rigid pigeonholing that he uses destroys the continuity of the historical 
process. 
Toynbee is interested in the external relations between discrete units, 
since this is the only part of history susceptible to a positivist approach. 
History is too amorphous, too full of interdependency and continuity for much 
to be gained by such an approach. For Toynbee, a civilization cannot evolve 
into a new form of itself; when it changes, then it ceases to be itself and 
becomes a new civilization. Unfortunately, the Romans present a gray area that 
will not fit neatly into either of two pigeonholes, so he edits away the creative 
aspect of Rome to make it fit. 
Collingwood sees the naturalistic view as fundamentally wrongheaded for an 
additional reason. For Toynbee, as for a scientists, 'the subject of study is a 
spectacle to be observed. Thus, he can never penetrate to the real subject-
matter of history, its internal aspect of thought as that which drives and ex-
plains the external events. This thought cannot be understood unless the his-
torian internalizaes it and, in Collingwood's phrase, reenacts it in his own 
mind. Toynbee, by closely following the positivist notion of what facts are 
and how they should be handled, is blinded to this most important aspect of 
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history 
Oswald Spengler's Decline of The West illustrates the dangers inherent in 
' the other half of the positivist method, that purports to formulate general laws 
governing the course of history. True scientific laws are predictive, on the 
principle that if all past cases can be subsumed under a certain formula, then 
all future cases can be reliable predicted by that formula. As Spengler ap-
plies this to history, there is no interpretation of events and thought, but on-
ly subsumption of occurences under his grand historical scheme. 
19 
Spengler's work takes to extremes many of the positivist elements that can 
also be found in Toynbee's writing. Like Toynbee, he saw history as made up 
of distinct civilizations. However, he re~arded them as monads, isolated from 
one another. The analogy that drives his thought makes civilizations behave much 
like organisms, a very compatible notion to a positivist. Each society has 
clearly defined stages of growth, maturity and decay that are precisely compar-
able to the stages in the life-cycle of other societies. Spengler was not in-
terested in doing history. He wanted to construct a morphology of history that 
eliminates the unique, the accidental, the transitory, in short the progressive 
nature of history in favor of a structure of forms that can be captured by gen-
eral laws. Like true scientific laws, his scheme of history claims to have 
predictive power. To gain this power, though, like Toynbee he must.ignore the 
internal side of history, the thoughts of which events are merely expressions. 
Spengler handled the evidence presented by these events in a profoundly unhis-
torical way. He did not interpret it in an effort to gain knowledge of the 
lives and thoughts of men, but tried to extract a general law from it to graph 
the coming decline of the West. 
The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce presents a sharp contrast to Toyn-
bee and Spengler. Collingwood places him at the pinnacle of European thought 
on history because he finally established the autonomy of history after the 
millenia~long struggle. Not surprisingly, they have much in common. 
Croce's work on the idea of history began with an 1894 essay dealt with 
history as a kind of art, in direct oppos'i.tion to the trend toward subjugating 
history to natural science. He defined art as representing, as a part of 
what is possible, an intuitive vision of individuality. In contrast, science 
is knowledge of the general, as it tries to organize facts under general laws. 
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Since it narrates the real, a subset of the possible, and is concerned with in-
dividuals and not generalities, history can be considered a very peculiar kind 
of art 
The distinctions between history and nature, and history and science, were 
elaborated in some of Croce 1 s later work. For him, natural science was made up 
of thought about pseudo-concepts, constructions that are artificial because 
they are either frankly abstract, as in the concept of a triangle, or are 
empirical terms for grouping phenomena that could be grouped in other ways with 
equal truth, as in the concepts of cat or rose. The value of natural science is 
oractical, for it teaches us not to understand reality, but to manipulate it. 
For Croce, nature was an ambiguous term, both real and unreal. If by nature 
we mean individual events, then it is real, but it is 'also synonymous with, 
or at least a part of history. If we mean a system of abstract laws, then 
we are speaking of nature as a pseudo-concept which we use to organize 
those individual facts. Croce has performed the remarkable feat of reversing 
the positivist positions of. science arid history. Under his scheme, natural 
science is dependent on history, for the scientific work cannot begin until 
the historical work is done. 
Having dealt with natural science, Croce turned to philosophy as a threat 
to historical autonomy. Hegel's scheme to impqse a philosophical history on 
top of ordinary history, as though ordinary history were not reflective and 
philosophical embodies. Croce held that philosophical knowledge is already part 
of history and is contained in the universal, and universally shared, con-
cepts that inform historical judgments. Philosophy thinks through the mean-
ings, concepts, and language through which we view and interpret the events of 
the past. Again, Croce turned the tables on previous thinkers by making 
history necessary for philosophy. His position holds history to be 11 the 
concrete thought of which philosophy is only the methodology of hi'story. 
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Croce's final position on histo~y thus fully establishes its autonomy, 
allowing it to carry on in its own way for its own reasons. The conception of 
history that results from these arguments bears some looking at, since it is 
very close to the one Collingwood defends in his philosophical Epilegomena. 
Properly conceived, history is contemporary history in the sense that it is not 
captured by mere documents, but 11 lives only as ~ present interest and pursuit 
in the mind of the historian 11 as he does history. The essential condition for 
historical knowledge is that past events must be reenacted in the historian's 
mind when the evidence for them is present and intelligible to him. History 
can thus be distinguished from chronicle, which is 11 the past as merely believed 
upon testimony but not historically known 11 or genuinely internalized and under-
stood. This in turn enables a final distinction between evidence and testi-
many. Both are artifacts left by the past. It is how they are viewed and used 
that distinguishes the two. Testimony is accepted at face value. Evidence ex-
ists only when those artifacts are 11 interpreted on critical principles 11 • The 
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essence of doing history lies in applying critical principles to evidence. 
Collingwood's historical inquiry concludes with Croce, whose ideas are 
very similar to his own. This inquiry, as I have tried to show, is not without 
its flaws. If there is a common thread underlying the various problems in Col-
lingwood' s account, it stems from his theoretical turn of mind. He wants to 
show the development of history as orderly and unbroken progress, pbscuring the 
fitful, three step,s forward one step back progress that it seems actually to have 
made. He sometimes emphasizes the advances of various schools of thought at 
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the cost of presenting clearly their failings~ His section on Vico, which 
glosses over the anachronisms in his New Science that show the resilience of 
---medieval thought and the sallowness of the Renaissance influence, is the 
clearest example of this tendency. While this turn of Collingwood 1 s mind 
leads to some distortion, it is by no means a fatal flaw. The account that 
he gives of the course that the idea of history has followed seems generally 
accurate. It would be advisable, though, to keep this overly theoretical 
tendency of Collingwood 1 s in mind as we approach his philosophical inquiry. 
Philosophical Inquiry 
The Epilegomena in Collingwood's T~I~a ~~is a philosophical, 
analytic look at several aspects of the historical enterprise. It can be seen 
as a detailed exposition of his four-part definition of history, which bears 
repeating here. Collingwood claims that 11 history should be (a) a science, or 
an answering of question; (b) concerned with human actions in the past; (c) 
pursued by interpretation of evidence and; (d) for the sake of human self-
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.kn owl edge 11 My focus wi 11 be somewhat narrower than his because 
I will concentrate on certain aspects of par.ts a,b, and c of his definition, 
and not address part d at all. The more metaph~sical questions about the na-
ture of mind, the value of history, and his broader epistemological concern 
with the nature of knowledge will be slighted in favor of a more practical or-
ientation. Questions of more immediate interest to a practicing historian 
~ill be addressed, including what the criterion of historical truth might be, and 
what sources and evidence are and how they should be handled. 
Collingwood's concern with autonomy is prominent throughout the Epilego-
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mena, as it drives his inquiry and informs his conclusions. He attempts to 
achieve di sci pl inary autonomy by establishing the separation· of hi story 
and the natural sciences, and then makes a less successful attempt~to estbblish 
the autonomy of the individual historian. These interrelated concerns underly 
the practical questions of historical method. 
One of the first milestones in Collingwood 1 s pursuit of autonomy is his 
establishment once and for all of a distinction between history and natural 
science. This may seem peculiar, in light of his definition of history as 
11 (a) a science". However, he was not construing the term 11 science 11 as a short-
hand label for natural science. Indeed, he derided such narrow constructions 
as "slang usage 11 , and opted for a more inclusive definition of science as 11 an 
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organized body of knowledge 11 . History, however, is organized differ-
ently from natural science. His discussion is in many ways an extension of 
Croce•s thought on the same subject. Collingwood essentially sets out two ways 
that history and natural science differ. The first distinction is found in 
the type of inference used, and the second in the object of their inquiries. 
What is "inference"? To Collingwood, it is a tenn that includes much, for l J,-
to say that a body of knowledge is organized is to say that it is inferential ~ 
The practitioner of any science is not allowed to claim that he 
knows something unless and until he can justify, that claim by demonstrating the 
grounds on which it is made. This demonstration is the inference of the con-
·clusion from its premisses and it is what orga~izes the body of knowledge. 
What distinguishes historical from other types of scientific inference? 
The exact sciences of geometry and mathematics use deductive inference. Its 
chief characteristic is that it has a kind of 11 logical compulsion" where once 
the initial assumptions are accepted, e.g. a straight line the shortest dis-
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tance between two points, then the conclusion follows inevitably. The other, 
observational and experimental sciences use inductive inference, in which gen-
eral patterns are constructed from particular observations, as one 11 proceeds 
from the particular to the universal". Inductive conclusions are "proven" only 
in a relatively weak sense of the word, as they do not compel a certain 
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conclusion, but only give permission to see it. 
However, history remains indistinguishable from the observational and exp-
erimental sciences, since all three are non-deductive. It can be readily dis-
tinguished from these natural sciences on the basis of what counts for an 
observation in each discipline. In the experimental, sciences, observations are 
of events made to happen under controlled conditions, something simply not 
possible in historical studies. Similarly, observational scientists rarely 
accept the observations of others, but go and make observations themselves, 
though historians can never directly observe the events they study. These 
sciences can also be distinguished from history on the basis of their aims. 
N~tural scientists make observations in order to ''detect the constant or re-
curring features in events of a certain kind". To use Collingwood's example, 
meteorologists study cyclones to compare them to other cyclones with the aim 
of discovering which features are recurring, or "to find out what cyclones are 
like". His inference is inductive, for it proc~eds from particular cyclones to 
general laws about cyclonic behavior. The historian's aim in studying a part-
icular war is not necessarily to make generalizations about, and certainly not 
to formulate scientific laws governing, wars. More likely, he aims at placing 
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that war in the context of human activity in which it occurred. 
Is this induction? It seems not, though Collingwood does not directly add-
ress the question. The historian does not proceed from the particular to the 
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universal, but rather from one particular to the next, while considering each 
an embodiment of more general tendencies or traits. There are no in-
violate, universal laws in history, for it is a human activity, and men are al-
ways redefining and changing the rules. 
Another approach to the difference between history and the natural sci-
ences is to examine the object of their study. The key to this approach is 
rather obliquely alluded to in part (b) of C~llingwood's definition of history 
as "concerned with human actions in the past 11 • History is concerned with ac-
tions, observational science with mere events. The distinction between an action 
and an event arises because actions are two-dimensional, with an inside and an 
outside, but events have only an outside. 
Collingwood defines the outside of an action as "everything belonging to it 
that can be described in terms of bodies and their movements", while its inside 
is "that in it which can only be described in terms of thought". In his 
example of an historical action, Caesar crossing the Rubicon, the outside is 
Caesar's crossing of the river, while its inside is his defiance of Republican 
law. An historian is interested in both dimensions. His work will most likely 
begin with the outside of the action, but he is not finished until he has pen-
etrated into the action and "discerned the thought of the agent". The true ob- .. 
56 ject of historical study is this thought, for tt is what explains events. 
Occurences in nature.are mere e~ents, with-no inside dimension. The nat-
ural scientist, like the historian, does not stop with the mere discovery of the 
event. Instead o{p~netrating into its inside, though, the natural scientist 
goes beyond the event, to discover its relation to other events and subsume it 
under a scientific law. The historian moves in the opposite direction, Colling-
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wood claims, by penetrating into the~ However, this is correct only to 
the extent that the historian's task is limited to discovering the ~gent's 
thought. Frequently, though, historians also go beyond the action at hand and 
relate it to other actions, for how else is the significance of an act to be 
determined? Caesar may have been rebelling against Republican law in crossing 
the Rubicon, but both that event,and his intentions can have very little signif-
icance if not placed in the context of Roman history. Though Collingwood's 
account may be incomplete in this way, "he does make his point of distinguishing 
history from the natural sciences by way of their object. 
Collingwood's metaphor of the inside and outside of actions is of consid~ 
erable importance for his entire theory of historical understanding, and so 
merits close scrutiny. In the first place, he is not entirely consistent in 
his use of the metaphor. When introduced 11 outside 11 seems to refer entirely to 
the physical action or bodily movements of the agent. In his later discussion 
of autobiography, though, we find that thoughts can be expressed in the agent's 
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flow of consciousness· He even discusses thinking itself as a form of 
activity. If such forms of reflection are action, and action must be the 
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"unity of the inside and outside of an event" J then we are left with 
the somewhat paradoxical situation of an action's outside being entirely inside. 
Some sharpening of his metaphor is plainly' necessary. W.H. Dray's discussion 
of Collingwoodian understanding indicates one way of interpreting this metaphor 
which has the virtue of making clear a very practical problem facing histor-
ians. Rather than narrowly defining "outside" as physical movement, it should 
be redefined as "whatever event expresses a thought". The "inside" thus be-
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comes "whatever thought is expressed" This revised view allows for 
the all too frequent incompleteness of the available historical data. Many 
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reJevant, interesting and historically significant thoughts are not expressed 
in any discernable form. When, for instance, did Richard III decide to seize 
th~ throne of England? Whatever date the historian chooses will have a tremen~ 
dous influence on his interpretations of Richard's actions prior to the usurp-
ation. The historian will, however, have no direct evidence in the form of 
outr.ight expressions of Richard's decision. In those troubled times, Richard 
wisely kept his own counsel in matters of high treason. 
Nonetheless, Collingwood does make a point. An object of historical in-
quiry is thought, for it is necessary to explain an agent's action. History 
is thus distinguished from natural science, and disciplinary autonomy is 
achieved. However, two very significant questions remain about this object of 
inquiry. ·Is thought, as Collingwood claims, the sole object of historical 
inquiry? or is it both necessary and sufficient for explanation? Also, how are 
we to discover what the thoughts actually were of a man who lived and died hun-
dreds of years ago? 
Collingwood's position on the primacy of thought is clear. "At bottom 
[the historian] is concerned with thoughts alone; with their outward expression 
in events he is concerned only by the way, in so far as these reveal to him the 
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thoughts of which he is in search." He is quite consistent in main-
taining this position throughout the Epilegome~a. In connection with it he 
makes one of his best-known statements about history , a claim so bold that it 
has about it an air of paradox. 
Collingwood claims that "when [the historian] knows what happened, he al-
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ready knows why it happened" This seems somewhat implausible at 
first glance, for any student of history can recall knowing what happened in a 
certain historical drama without knowing why. While it may on occasion happen 
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tfiat the evidence establishing that an event happened also gives an indication 
why, it is clear that this is not necessarily so. History books ar~ full of 
actions that undoubtedly occurred, but without anyone having any conclusive evi-
dence on why they were done. 
The paradox can be recast in light of Collingwood 1 s theory of what it is to 
fully know an historical action. One does not really know what an action was 
until one has discovered its inner, thought-side. It is this thought-side 
that allows full explanation, or answers the question 11 why? 11 • By the time an 
historian has fully described an action, then, he has also explained it. An 
action, fully conceived, is self-explanatory. 
However, Collingwood 1 s paradox breaks down when placed in the context of 
his argument on the two-dimensionality of action. In 'reading that when an his-
torian knows what happened, he already knows why it happened, we assume that 
the 11 what"and the 11 it 11 refer to the same thing. To apply Collingwood's example to 
the paradox, when the historian knows that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, he al-
ready knows why Caesar crossed the Rubicon. This is not necessarily so. How-
ever, if 11 it 11 refers to the outside of the action, and 11 what 11 to its inside, 
then the paradox makes sense. In other words, when the historian knows that 
Caesar was defying Republican law, he already knows why Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon. This is no longer a paradox, because the paradox rests :on equivocat-
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ing 11what 11 and 11 it 11 • 
It may also no longer be an answer to the question 11 why? 11 • Answering such 
questions seems to require a distinction between what is explained and what ex-
plains it. What needs explanation, no doubt, is action. Actions have a 
thought-side. When this thought-side is discovered, it is part of the action 
which must be explained; it part of what needs explaining, so how can it be 
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explanatory? Collingwood attempts to collapse this distinction between what is 
explained and what does the explaining with his paradox, but it is by no means 
clear that thought is self-explanatory. It may always be asked of a thought, 
but why did he think that.? 
How does this bear on thought as the object of historical inquiry? Col-
lingwood 1 s statement stands revealed as an overstatement of an important truth. 
Historians do need to be concerned with the thought of the agent. However, to 
fully explain an action, the historian must put it into the context of earlier 
and later events, for only in this way can a full account of its causes be 
given and its significance be determined. In addition to his motives, a full 
account of why Caesar crossed the Rubicon includes an account of the events 
that put him, so to speak, on the banks of the ·xubic'on. Tho~ght is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition of historical explanation. 
Despite these caveats, though, Collingwood's point again comes through. 
The historian must be concerned with thought. How, then,is he to discover 
these thoughts? He appears to give an answer to this question in 11 The Sci-
ence of Human Nature". Collingwood asks "But how does the historian discern 
the t.houghts which he is trying to discover?" and replies "There is only one 
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way in which it can be done: by rethinking them in his own mind. 11 
This is Orie aspect of the famous re-enactment d~ctrine. Although this state~ 
ment takes the form of a methodological prescription, a different interpreta-
tion becomes necessary when it is placed in the context of two other sections 
of the Epil egomena. In "Hi story as Re-enactment of Past Experi ence 11 and "The 
Historical Imagination 11 , the_ re-enactment doctrine is presented as the criter-
ion of truth in historical inquiry; as its goal, not its method. 
Collingwood's historical method is explicitJy presented in "Historical 
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E~idence 11 • It begins with the discussion, already examined, of the inferential, 
sY.stematic nature of all sciences. A question remains: What is the proper form 
of inference for an historian to use? How should he reason, and what should he 
reason from? Collingwood approaches this negatively, by rejecting one method, 
then positively, by outlining his own. Throughout, his concern is to make the 
hi~torian autonomous. 
The method he rejects has already been alluded to in his historical inqui-
ry,. Here, he labels it scissors-and~paste history. It is predicated on the 
testimony of authorities, which the historian assembles or collates in the 
course of his work, hence the term 11 scissors-and-paste 11 • The scissors-and-paste 
historian has given up his autonomy, for he depends on this testimony. He 
accepts the ready-made answers of his authorities as sufficient to satisfy his 
historical inquiries. 
Straightforward scissors-and-paste was the historical method of the Middle 
Ages, but was supplanted by critical scissors-and-paste, which examined author-
ities critically to determine their credibility. This critical history was not 
yet autonomous either, for a statement was either incorporated into the history 
or discarded. The historian still accepted ready-made answers, after scrutiny 
to be sure, but this was merely a refinement of the old method. The question 
asked about evidence was whether it was true or'false, not what it meant. Ac-
cording to Collingwood, this second question is the important one, and is the 
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key to doing history 
Finally, Collingwood rejects as mere pigeon-holing the "scientific his-
tories" of the late ninteenth and early twentieth centuries, including those 
of Toynbee and ~·Spengler. These positivist histories, besides their weaknesses 
already discussed in the historical inquiry, made no advancement in methods for 
31 
ascertaining historical facts. They merely took scissors-and-paste 11 fatts 11 and 
attempted to extrapolate from them. 
What, then, does Collingwood demand of historians? Obviously, the histor-
ian must be more than a mere recorder or chronicler. He must be a theorist who 
can go beyond what is given him and construct a theory that supplements.and ex-
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plains the available evidence ·He must be able to find more than is 
simply handed him by his sources. This part of what it means to be autonomous, 
"where by autonomy [Collingwood] means the condition of bein~ one's own auth-
ority, making statements or taking actions on one's own initiative and not be-
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cause those statements or actions are authorized or prescribed by someone else 11 
Thus, for Collingwood, 11 history so far from depending on ~ 
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testimony therefore has no relation with testimony at all 11 
He claims to have devised a method for doing history that will meet all 
of these conditions, and make the historian independent of both authorities 
and testimony. One hardly needs to point out the radical nature of his claim, 
for how else is the historian to study the past than by relying on the recorded 
testimony of the times? 
He first presents his method by way of an example, a stylized detective 
story called 11.Who Killed John Doe? 11 , in which he purports to illustrate a para-
digm of autonomous thinking. Briefly, John Doe was killed by his neighbor the 
rector, who he .was blackmailing. The rector's daughter confesses to the crime. 
Her young man had been staying with them the night of the crime. The detective 
assumes she is trying to protect him. Her young man had in fact been out in 
the middle of the night in question, but refused to say why because he was pro-
tecting the rector. The detective finally identifies the murderer largely by 
way of physical evidence like ashes in the dustbin and paint smears on a cler-
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ical jacket recently donated to· charity. 
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Collingwood is attempting to illustrate autonomous reasoning that does not 
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"logically depend on ... statements made by other persons" This is 
simply not the case. Some testimony, including that of a maid to the effect 
that the young man's shoes were muddy, simply accepted. Further, there is 
much material in the story that is testimony-contaminated, such as the blithely 
stated proposi:tion that "John Doe is a bla.ckmailer 11 , or that the glove buttons 
found in the dustbin were from 11 a famous glovemaker in Oxford Street whom the 
re'ctor always patronized. 11 
Finally, of course, there is a fundamental difference in the situation 
fa~ing our detective and the conditions under which an historian must operate. 
The detective's investigation is fairly contemporaneous with the events that 
he is studying. Much of the evidence he relies on in the story simply would 
not be directly available to the historian. Collingwood emphasizes the role 
played by the detective's own observations in making his thinking autonomous, 
for example, "John Doe was·. lying across his desk with a dagger in his back ... 11 • 
Much that is contained in these Observations could only be available to the his-
torian through testimony, which is precisely what Collingwood wants, to avoid. 
Clearly, then, Collingwood's example is not illustrative. What of his 
method, as he later outlines it? It revolves around asking question. To 
paraphrase Sir Francis Bacon, the historian must put his authorities to the 
69 
question, and "this questioning activity if the dominant factor in history" 
These questions are put by the historian to himself, so that every 
step in his inference is driven by a question. A brief illustration may be made 
using the confession of the rector's daughter. Is she telling the truth? 
·Probably not, as she has neither the strength to stab someone of the anatomical 
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knowledge to make such an efficient job of it, and if st,e did, she would 
sca'rcely rush in and accuse herself. Why is she lying? To protect.someone. 
Whd? Who does she suspect? Her Young man? He was there, and capable of it. 
By 'pursuing this sort of internal dialogue, a more complete picture of events 
can be constructed than is contained on the face of the evidence. 
How does this establish autonomy? The questioner is no longer relying on 
statements made by others as evidence. His conclusions are drawn, not from 
these ready-made statements, Collingwood tells us, but from his own, autonomous 
statement that 11 I am now reading or hearing a statement to such-and-such effect11 
This mechanical shortcut to autonomy is plainly inadequate. A scissors-
and~paste historian could achieve such autonomous sta~ements with no real 
change in his method; he would only have to be a little more longwinded. As 
has been observed, 11 whatever makes propositions useful as premisses within an 
inquiry, it is not the mere fact that the inquirer can state that he has heard 
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them uttered or seen them wri tten 11 
Collingwood's attempt to achieve absolute freedom from reliance on testi-
mony fails. We must always rely on it at some level. How are we to know that 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon unless someones testifies to it? Even if we deny the 
validity of that testimony, the grounds that we, deny it on will be, at the 
least, testimony-contaminated. For instance, one such ground might be that our 
original authority was an enemy of Caesar's. How are we to know this, unless 
someone has either testified to it directly, or testified about actions from 
which it can be inferred? 
Our original desire to know how to discover the thoughts of historical 
agents is also apparently unsati~fied. It is true that Collingwood has given 
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us no magical formula fdr discovering these thoughts. What he does give us is 
a method that will enable us to gain a fuller picture of past actions. This 
pi4ture will be complete enough to enable us, some of the time at least, to re-
en~ct those past events, see them from the agent's point of view, and thus re-
think the thought of the agent. This is the goal of the historian, and the 
source of the criterion for historical truth. Collingwood claims that it is, 
ultimately, the source of the historian's autonomy. 
How can this re-enactment or rethinking of past events or thoughts give 
autonomy to an historian? Collingwood presents his answer in "The Historical 
Imagination" by trying to find an autonomous criterion of historical truth. 
He begins, as usual, by rejecting several proposed criteria. Truth cannot be 
established by the agreement between the historian's statements and those of 
his authorities, for against what do we check the authorities' statements? 
The point of application of the criterion is mere·ly. pushed back one step. 
Neither can it be established by the historian's experience of the world, that 
tells him that some kinds of things happen and some do not, for much fiction 
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could pass for history under this criterion. 
What the historian is doing is inferring from his evidence, to go beyond 
it or inside of it. This is both a critical and constructive activity. It is 
constructive because it aims at creating a more complete picture by interpolat-
ing the events and thoughts that must have occurred by are not explicitly con-
tained in the evidence. He must use his imagination to fill in the gaps in the 
historical narrative. This imagination is an essential part of historical infe-
rence. 
Collingwood is careful to emphasize that because his historical·imagina-
tion is directed t h a t e past and guided by evidence, it is not mere arbitrary 
fancy. However, to think for history as "a web of reconstruction pegged 
down, s~peak, to the facts by the statements of authorities" is to 
beg the question of historical truth, for it falls back on an already re-
35 
jected criterion of truth. Co 11 in gwood is thus driven to con c 1 ude, that for 
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"historical thought there are properly speaking no data" 
Collingwood claims that the historian 1 s picture of the past, his re-en-
actment of it or his web of imaginative construction, serves as the criterion 
of historical truth. It is entirely the historian's own product, and so with 
it he achieves autonomy. But can this criterion actually separate fact from 
fancy? It is, after all, wholly a product of imagination. Indeed, Colling-
wood himself makes analogies between the work of the historian and the nove-
1 i~t. They diverge, though, because ~the historian's.picture stands in a 
74 
peculiar relation to something called evidence 11 What is this peculiar 
relation, since Collingwood has earlier stated that ·.this picture justifies 
75 
the sources used inits construction? This web of reconstruction 11 actually 
serves as the touchstone by which we decide whether alleged facts are gen-
76 
uine This is a peculiar relation indeed. Under this view, an historian 
is justified in rejecting evidence that contradicts his theory. If it does 
not fit into his imaginative picture, it is false or spurious. 
Collingwood's search for autonomy has carried him far afield, as the 
historian is made successively independent of authorities, testimony, and 
fin~lly evidence and data. The underlying fl~w-in Collingwood's philosophical 
search for autonomy is that he aimed 
autonomy, in which the historian was 
too high, for a theore~ical~~ 
entirely self-contained~ ~ 
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Conclusion 
The idea of history passed through four fairly distinct stages in its 
development from Herodotus to Croce and Collingwood. It began in Classical 
Greece with Herodotus's scientific yet limited history of recent events. 
Unfortunately, though the idea of history was clear in Herodotus's mind, the 
substantialism of Platonist Greek thought denied it a chance at wider ac-
ceptance. The second stage was marked by the elimination of the substantial-
isttheoretical underpinnings in favor of more useful Christian ideas. Med-
ieval Christianity also eliminated both the critical attitude and the human-
ist orientation necessary for fully-rounded history. The rise of natural 
scfence brought with it a secularism that restored hu~anism and a certain 
cri~ical method to history while retaining the theoretical advances of med-
ieval thought. Again, though, this advance came at a price. In asserting 
the~r claim to knowled~e, the scientists claimed that theirs was the only 
way to knowledge. It was not until the late nineteenth century ·that this 
final roadblock was removed and an autonomous idea of history was fully ar-
ticulated and defended by Croce. 
In his philosophical inquiry, Collingwood takes up where Croce left off. 
He builds on Croce's idea of history as autonomous and distinct from the natu-
ral sciences due to its unique subject-matter. Collingwood elaborates on 
this thesis by arguing that historical action m~st be explained by reference 
to the thought of the agent. He loses perspective, though, in his account 
of the unique features of history, and claims that thought is sufficient 
for historical explanation. This is little more than an error of emphasis, 
and easily remedied. He goes more fundamentally astray in his pursuit of 
autonomy for the historian. 
apply to men working in the human, as opposed to natural 
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pure to 
He at-
tempts to make the historian entirely independent. ultimately even of data, 
and as a result makes him self-contained and independent of external influ-
ences, like evidence. 
A yearning for the abstract, theoretically pure is at the root of Col-
lingwood's most serious flaws. It is revealed in his historical inquiry 
by his desire for an unbroken progress from historical ignorance to enlight-
enment. His fully-fledged, autonomous historian is held to an impossible 
high standard, quite impractical for the day-to-day realities of discovering 
and writing about the past. 
Without doubt, though, Collingwood's exploration of the practice of his-
tor~, past and present, is a remarkable achievement. If occasional omissions 
do occur, the advance of historical thought over two and a half millennia 
is well illustrated and its contemporary failings are strongly criticized. 
His program and methods, though carried too far, contain much that is worth-
while, even if only as a foil against which the reflective historian can 
sharpen his own methods and test his assumptions. As subsequent academic 
dis~ussion h~s proven, Collingwood's book has earned a place in the contin-
uing development of the idea of history. Though he may not have the final 
answer, Collingwood does ask some interesting questions. 
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